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PARADISE LOST, PARADOX
REVISITED: THE IMPLICATIONS OF
FAMILIAL IDEOLOGY FOR
FEMINIST, LESBIAN, AND GAY
ENGAGEMENT TO LAW©
By SiEL Y A.M. GAVIGAN*
In this article the author addresses the theoretical and political challenges
issued to feminists and feminist scholarship by recent debates and litigation
concerning "family" and "family-based" benefits. The argument proceeds in
four parts: first, the discussion is relocated within socialist feminist theory. The
implications of the qualified pro-family stance in the critiques advanced or
influenced by women of colour is considered next, followed by an examination
of some proposals to extend the definition of "spouse" and "family" to lesbian
and gay relationships. The author is critical of both "critiques" and illustrates
with reference to Canadian welfare and immigration law that feminists,
lesbians, and gays must be attentive to the complex and contradictory
implications of family-based strategies.
Successful ideologies are often thought to render their beliefs natural and self-
evident-to identify them with the 'common sense' of a society so that nobody could
imagine how they might ever be different. ... On this view, a ruling ideology does not so
much combat alternative ideas as thrust them beyond the very bounds of the thinkable.1
© 1994, Shelley A.M. Gavigan. This article was accepted for publication in November, 1992.
* Associate Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. Dedicated to the
spirit and memory of Jacqui Greatbatch (1955-1991), late staff lawyer, Parkdale Community Legal
Services. I wish to acknowledge with thanks Niki Cunningham and Melanie Kraft for their research
assistance, Jill Maltby for her technidal assistance, Karen Andrews, Irene Banks, Susan Boyd,
Dorothy Chunn, Brenda Cossman, David Draper, Judy Fudge, Harry Glasbeek, Didi Herman,
Dianne Martin, Ian Morrison, Elizabeth Pickett, Bruce Ryder, and Toni Williams for their
comments or criticisms on an earlier draft. As I did not act on all the good advice I received,
responsibility for errors and weaknesses remains with me. I wish especially to acknowledge my
indebtedness to Judy Deverell whose acumen and encouragement yet again made completing this
article possible.
1 T. Eagleton, Ideology:An Introduction (London: Verso, 1991) at 58.
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Attacking the family wage is a bit like an atheist attacking god the father. She wants to
say that it does not exist, that the false idea that it does exist has evil consequences and
that even if it did exist it would not be a good thing.2
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I. INTRODUCTION
Theoretical complexities confronting Canadian feminists are not
so much new as newly acknowledged. The most recent and most
powerful example is the imperative to address racism and its
implications in our work, and in our society more generally. Lesbians
and gay men also challenge feminists to struggle against homophobia
and to unravel the myriad ways heterosexual assumptions and
prescriptions inform and deform social relations and social life.
Additionally, feminists who problematize questions of class structure
and class relations are illustrating that class is a concept and a relation
that is inevitably mediated by gender and race relations. Those of us
who work in law endeavour to explicate the roles played by lawyers,
judges, and legal institutions, and the significance of legal principles and
processes in all of this. This is not a modest task.
A serious challenge has been issued by critical scholars, political
activists, and lawyers, who are grappling with two difficult and complex
issues confronting feminist legal scholarship and feminism more
generally: the social and legal marginalization of women of colour, and
2 M. Barrett & M. McIntosh, "The 'Family Wage': Some Problems for Socialists and
Feminists" in T. Lovell, edgritish Feminist Thought:A Reader (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990) 134
at 139.
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of lesbians and gay men. In particular, feminist criticism of "the family"
has been criticized in turn both by scholars and activists, who are
analyzing the effects of racism and by those leading the current
campaign to extend spousal benefits, if not full family status, to lesbian
and gay couples. Indeed, the challenge can be stated succinctly:
feminists who adopt a critical stance toward "the family" have been
urged to acknowledge and rethink the white, heterosexual privilege
apparently implicit in such an analysis.
The heightened visibility of these issues in Canadian law and
feminism is timely, as is the necessity to respond to and engage in this
important discussion. I propose to do this in four parts. First, I will
relocate this particular discussion within socialist feminist theory and
practice. Next, I will consider the implications of the qualified pro-
family stance in the critiques advanced or influenced by women of
colour. I will then take up the argument advanced by others that the
family is a site of "heterosexual privilege," as evidenced in part by the
current prevailing legislative definitions of "spouse." In the final section,
drawing upon a socialist feminist conceptualization of the "family" and
familial ideology, I will illustrate, with reference to Canadian welfare
and immigration law (notably the legislative definitions of "family" and
"spouse"), that feminist analysis and advocacy must both identify and
explain the specificity and interconnectedness of gender, race, and class
relations.
It is not sufficient simply to discover and declare race, class, and
sexual orientation; one must also illustrate and analyze the inequalities
that flow therefrom. Despite the insistence by many feminists, including
those who are women of colour, of the simultaneous, intersecting or
interlocking nature of gender, race, and class inequalities, 3 the image
that often emerges is one of discrete compartments in a pyramid of
3 See, for example, H.V. Carby, "White woman listen! Black feminism and the boundaries of
sisterhood" in Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, ednze Empire Strikes Back Race and
Racism in 70s Britain (London: Hutchinson in association with the Centre for Contemporary
Cultural Studies, University of Birmingham, 1982) 212; P. Parmar, "Gender, race and class: Asian
women in resistance" in Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, ed., ibid. 236; J. Cook & S.
Watt, "Racism, Women and Poverty" in C. Glendinning & . Millar, eds., Women and Poverty in
Britain (London: Wheatsheaf Books, 1987) 53; T. Williams, "Re-Forming 'Women's' Truth: A
Critique of the Report of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women in Canada" (1990) 22
Ottawa L. Rev. 725; P.H. Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics
of Empowerment: Perspectives on Gender, vol. 2 (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990); and H. Bannerji,
"But Who Speaks For Us? Experience and Agency in Conventional Feminist Paradigms" in H.
Bannerji et aL, eds., Unsettling Relations: The University as a Site of Feminist Struggles (Toronto:
Women's Press, 1991) 67.
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oppressions4 in which gender becomes simply a site of privilege, and
class drops out, or worse, becomes a bad attitude--"classism." 5 In this
paper, I argue that this layering or compartmentalizing approach to the
analysis of social relations obscures more than it reveals. In sum, I raise
some questions in an attempt to clarify my own thinking and to
contribute to continuing dialogue regarding these issues.
4 M.L Fineman, in "Challenging Law, Establishing Differences: The Future of Feminist Legal
Scholarship" (1990) 42 Fla. L. Rev. 25 at 39-40, has issued a note of caution concerning what she
regards as a tendency to regard race, class, and sexuality as the only relevant "markers of
difference" resulting in a "hierarchy of oppression," which does not address the myriad complexities
of women's lives. Again, this is not a new development nor one unique to feminist legal scholarship,
as Kathryn Harriss' retrospective article on the rather dispersed state of the British Women's
Liberation Movement illustrates. In "New Alliances: Socialist-Feminism in the Eighties" (1989) 31
Feminist Rev. 34 at 37, Harriss argues that in the early 1980s, "[a]n obsession seized the movement
for self-labelling and labelling others, not to elucidate debate but to fix a woman somewhere along a
predetermined hierarchy of oppressions in order to justify or contest a political opinion by reference
to the speaker's identity" [references omitted].
5 It is significant to note that "class" does not drop out in the black feminist work cited supra
note 3; however, it is invisible in some of the work inspired by the work of black feminists. See, for
example, M. Kline, "Race, Racism, and Feminist Legal Theory" (1989) 12 Harv. Women's LJ. 115;
E. Thornhill, "Focus on Black Women!" (1985) 1 Can. J. Women & L. 153; and J. Herbert,
"Otherness' and the Black Woman" (1989) 3 Can. J. Women & L 269. See also CA. MacKinnon,
"From Practice to Theory, or What is a White Woman Anyway?" (1991) 4 Yale J.L. & Feminism
13; MacKinnon, ibid. at 18, argues that "in recent critiques of feminist work ... it is worth noting that
the fact that there is such a thing as race and class is assumed." Harriss, ibi4 at 37 and at 38-39,
argues that in the British women's movement the slogan "the personal is political" took on a
meaning in which the political became reduced to the personal, and "the coinage of the term
'classism' served to reduce the whole issue of class exploitation to a set of attitudes or prejudices."
See also T. Eagleton, "Defending the Free World" (1990) Socialist Registrar 85. Eagleton, at 88,
observes that he has not encountered the concept of "classism" outside North America.
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II. FEMINISM AND "THE FAMILY"
At the outset, it must be acknowledged that not all feminists
adopt a deeply critical stance toward the family.6 While most
acknowledge women's double day of paid and domestic labour, the
nature of gender relations revealed by the forms of violence women and
children endure, the dimensions of women's sexual subordination,
poverty, and inequality in virtually every sphere of life, and so on, only
socialist feminists offer an explanation that systematically implicates the
nuclear family, and more specifically, familial ideology, in women's
subordination in Western capitalist societies.7 This concern with the
contribution of the family to women's oppression has led radical
feminists, such as the American legal theorist Catharine MacKinnon, to
argue that within socialist feminism,
6 See, for example, Judith Stacey's review of conservative feminists' stance toward the family in
"Are Feminists Afraid to Leave Home? The Challenge of Conservative Pro-family Feminism" in J.
Mitchell & A. Oakley, eds., Mhat is Feminism? (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986) 219; S.A.M.
Gavigan, "Law, Gender and Ideology" in A. Bayefsky, ed., Legal Theory Meets Legal Practice
(Edmonton: Academic Printing & Publishing, 1988) 283; and E. Abner, MJ. Mossman & E. Pickett,
"No More Than Simple Justice: Assessing the Royal Commission Report on Women, Poverty and
the Family" (1990) 22 Ottawa L Rev. 573. Abner, Mossman & Pickett, ibiad at 603, conclude that
the Royal Commission Report
rejected the profoundly critical stance toward the family which might have resulted in a
more clear understanding of the role of the family in the oppression of women, the need
for fundamental structural change for achieving equality goals, as well as the uneven
potential of law for securing such aims.
7 In the Canadian literature, D.E. Smith's early work stands out: see, for example, "Women's
inequality and the family" in A. Moscovitch & G. Drover, eds., Inequality: essays on the political
economy of social welfare (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981) 156. Smith, ibtd at 156,
carefully distinguished women's experience based on their class position:
Though it is a serious over-simplification to treat the family as the sole basis of women's
inequality, it is the social organization of women's labour in the home and outside, and
the relations between the two which are women's inequality, and it will be argued here
that the character of inequality and of its history differs in different class settings
[emphasis in original].
See also M. McIntosh, "The state and the oppression of women" inA. Kuhn &A. Wolpe, eds.,
Feminism and Materialism: Women and Modes of Production (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1978) 254; M. Barrett, Women's Oppression Today: Problems in Marxist Feminist Analysis (London:
Verso, 1980) [hereinafter Marxist Feminist Analysis]; M. Barrett, Women's Oppression Today: The
Marxist/Feminist Encounter, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 1988) [hereinafter Marxist/Feminist
Encounter]; M. Barrett & M. McIntosh, The Anti-social Family (London: Verso Editions, 1982); M.
Luxton, H. Rosenberg & S. Arat-Kog, Through the Iatchen Window: The Politics of Home and
Famil, 2d ed. (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1990); and M. Luxton & H.J. Maroney, "Begetting
Babies, Raising Children: The Politics of Parenting" in J. Roberts & J. Vorst, eds., Socialism in
Crisis? Canadian Perspectives (Winnipeg/Halifax Society for Socialist Studies/Fernwood Publishing,
1992) 161.
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women are reduced to some other category, such as "women workers," which is then
treated as coextensive with all women. Or, in what has become near reflex, women
become "the family," as if this single form of women's definition and confinement, which
is then divided on class lines, can be presumed to be the crucible of women's
determination [references omitted; emphasis added].
8
For her part, MacKinnon acknowledges that "race and class are deeply
imbedded in gender" but suggests that "[w]omen get their class status
through their sexual relations with men of particular classes."9 At best,
this notion of women's acquisition of class from men, not peculiar to
MacKinnon, makes it very difficult to identify the myriad processes and
sites through and in which class and race relations are implicated in
women's subordination. At worst, it consigns working class women to
their usual invisible place in orthodox Marxism and some feminism.
It would be naive to suggest that the legacy of what Mich~le
Barrett now calls the "Marxist/feminist encounter" has led to a complete
overhaul of Marxist analysis, or that socialist feminism is an ascendant
tendency within feminism more generally.1 0 My argument is, however,
that it continues to be necessary to identify and link the contribution of
familial ideology to the specificity of women's social, economic, and
sexual subordination in the current context. This does not lead to a
monocausal or "mono-sited" explanation of women's subordination;
would that there were but one crucible or linchpin implicated in the
construction of women's subordination.
For socialist feminists, the sexual division of labour; the role of
the state as a site of patriarchal capitalist relations of power; and the
8 Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989) 12.
See also CA. Mackinnon, "Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda For Theory"
(1982) 7 Signs 515 at 525, in which she characterized the elision in slightly different terms:
Most commonly, women are reduced to some other category, such as "women workers,"
which is then treated as coextensive with all women. Or, in what has become near reflex,
women become "the family," as if this single form of women's confinement (then divided
on class lines, then on racial lines) can be presumed the crucible of women's
determination [references omitted; emphasis in original].
9 Feminism Unmodified. Discourses on Life and Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1987) at 2.
10 Michble Barrett's important contribution to Marxist feminist theory (not cited by
MacKinnon in the work cited supra note 8) was first entitled Women's Oppression Today: Problems
in Marxist Feminist Analysis, supra note 7. The most recent revised edition reflects Barrett's less
sanguine position: Women's Oppression Today: The Marxist/Feminist Encounter, supra note 7; see her
assessment, ib4 at xxiv, of the decline and displacement of (white) socialist feminism: "the voices
now most effectively addressing questions of class, inequality, poverty and exploitation to a wider
public are those of black women, not white-socialist feminists." Barrett's critical reappraisal of the
possibilities of pursuing the Marxist/feminist encounter have continued with her recent book, The
Politics of Truth: From Marx to Foucault (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1991).
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socially-constructed separation of the public and private spheres have
been integral to an analysis of women's subordinationi 1 The insistence
on the implications of social construction is of fundamental importance:
if relations of subordination are socially constructed, it follows that they
can be changed.12 A vision of and a commitment to social change, to a
fundamental transformation of the dominant social, political, and
economic order to one based on principles of substantive equality in all
areas of life, out of necessity, informs the work of socialist feminists.
The commitment to historical-materialist methodology brings
with it an insistence upon historical and cultural specificity, upon
changing and different forms of women's oppression and resistance, and
an understanding that even in conditions of subordination, women and
men are active moral agents who participate in the construction and
change of both their experiences and the world.
Socialist feminists have no self-evident point of entry into law
and no blueprint is offered here. It is fair to suggest that a socialist
feminist presence in legal scholarship is still developing. So far, English
Canadian work has concentrated on the feminization of labour and the
gendered nature of labour relations;13 on research on the law-state
relation that takes issue with the trans-historical and universal claims of
radical feminist theory;14 on analysis of the problematic public/private
split entrenched in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,15 and
the equally problematic implications of feminist involvement in Charter
11 N. Adamson, L Briskin & M. McPhail, Feminist Organizing For Change: The Contemporary
Women's Movement in Canada (Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press, 1988) at 110-118; and J.
Fudge, "The Public/Private Distinction: The Possibilities of and the Limits to the Use of Charter
Litigation to Further Feminist Struggles" (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall LJ. 485 at 487-89 and at 509-24.
12 Marxist FeministAnalysis, supra note 7 at 250.
13 See, for example, J. Fudge, "Reconceiving Employment Standards Legislation: Labour
Law's Little Sister and the Feminization of Labour" (1991) 7 J.L. & Soc. Pol'y 73 [hereinafter
"Labour Laws Little Sister"]; . Fudge, "Gender Issues Arbitration" (1991) 1 Labour Arbitration
Y.B. 119; and M.E. McCallum, "Keeping Women in Their Place: The Minimum Wage in Canada,
1910-25" (1986) 17 Labour/Le Travail 29.
14 See, for example, S.A.M. Gavigan: "On 'Bringing on the Menses': The Criminal Liability of
Women and the Therapeutic Exception in Canadian Abortion Law" (1986) 1 Can. J. Women & L.
279; "Petit Treason in Eighteenth Century England: Women's Inequality Before the Law" (1989-
90) 3 Can. J. Women & L. 335 [hereinafter "Petit Treason"]; and "Women, Law and Patriarchal
Relations: Perspectives within the Sociology of Law" in N. Boyd, ed., The Social Dimensions of Law
(Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1986) 101.
15 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982,
c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
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litigation.16 It has also focussed on deploying neo-Marxist theoretical
tools to illustrate the ideological nature of the state and law, especially
family, welfare and child custody,17 and contributing more generally to
the development of a Marxist theoretical analysis of law.' 8 More
recently, socialist feminist legal scholars have begun to examine the
intersection of gender, race, and class and the implications of their
official invisibility in the areas of violence against women,'19 refugee
law,20 and the status of women more generally.2 ' The challenges,
possibilities, and implications of postmodernist critiques have also been
taken up 22 This scholarship is not homogeneous. But, while there is
both difference in emphasis and some disagreement between authors, a
body of socialist feminist legal scholarship now exists which may be
engaged by further work.
Socialist feminists do not address an abstract, ahistorical, trans-
historical, or "essential" family in our work. Despite the celebration of
16 Fudge, supra note 11; J. Fudge, "The Effect of Entrenching a Bill of Rights upon Political
Discourse: Feminist Demands and Sexual Violence in Canada" (1989) 17 Int'l J. Sociology L. 445.
17See S.B. Boyd: "Child Custody, Ideologies and Employment" (1989) 3 Can. J. Women & L.
111; "Child Custody Law and the Invisibility of Women's Work" (1989) 96 Queen's Q. 831; "Child
Custody and Working Mothers" in S.L. Martin & K.E. Mahoney, eds., Equality and Judicial
Neutrality (Toronto: Carswell, 1987) 168; "From Gender Specificity to Gender Neutrality?
Ideologies in Canadian Child Custody Law" in C. Smart & S. Sevenhuijsen, eds., Child Custody and
the Politics of Gender (London: Routledge, 1989) 126; and "Potentialities and Perils of the Primary
Caregiver Presumption" (1991) 7 Can. Fain. L.Q. 1. See also E.A. Pickett, Women, Law and Family
Mediation: A Feminist View of Formal and Informal Justice in Family Law (LL.M. Thesis, York
University, 1989); Gavigan, supra note 6; D.E. Chunn, From Punishment to Doing Good: Family
Courts and Socialized Justice in Ontario, 1880-1940 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992);
M.E. Morton, "Dividing the wealth, sharing the poverty: the (re)formation of 'family' in law in
Ontario" (1988) Can. Rev. Soc. & Anth. 254; and F. Stairs, "Sole Support Mothers and Opportunity
Planning in the Thomson Report" (1989) 5 J.L. & Social Pol'y 165.
18 See, for example, A. Bartholomew & S. Boyd, "Toward a Political Economy of Law" in W.
Clement & G. Williams, eds., The New Canadian Political Economy (Kingston: McGill-Queen's
University Press, 1989) 212; and J. Fudge, "What Do We Mean by Law and Social
Transformation?" (1990) 5 Can. J.L. & Soe'y 47.
19 J.L. Abell, Bringing It All Back Home: Feminist Struggle, Feminist Theory and Feminist
Engagement with Law, The Case of Wife Battering (LL.M. Thesis, York University, 1991).
20 j. Greatbatch, "The Gender Difference: Feminist Critiques of Refugee Discourse" (1989) 1
Int'l J. Refugee L. 518.
21 See Williams, supra note 3, and her analysis of the Report of the Royal Commission on the
Status of Women in Canada (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1970) (Chair: F. Bird).
22 S. Boyd, "Some Postmodernist Challenges to Feminist Analyses of Law, Family and State:
Ideology and Discourse in Child Custody Law" (1991) 10 Can. J. Faro L. 79.
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its naturalness, timelessness, and ubiquity, feminist historians 23 have
illustrated that the configuration of personal relations that our society
has come to understand as the family emerged at a distinct historical and
material conjuncture, whose dominance was consolidated over the
course of approximately a century.24
Feminist scholars who have examined the operation of family law
historically25 and in the current context 26 have illustrated that a
dominant model of family has been reproduced and reinforced through
law-it is heterosexual and nuclear in form, patriarchal in content. The
precise form of the legal supports has not been constant. There have
been important shifts away from "pure" patriarchy,27 leading at least one
23 C. Hall, "The Early Formation of Victorian Domestic Ideology" in S. Burman, ed., Fit Work
for Women (London: Croom Helm, 1979) 15. Leonore Davidoff and Catherine Hall in their Family
Fortunes: Men and women of the English middle class, 1780-1850 (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1987) at 31 remind us:
The variability of family forms cannot be overstressed; there is no essential 'family', but
always 'families'. The work of the Cambridge Group has taught us to differentiate clearly
between family and household. Miranda Chaytor's work on early modem households, in
particular, has drawn attention to the 'fragility and impermanency of most domestic
arrangements'. Her work is critically extended by feminist insights and chronicles the
differing experience of men and women, children and elders, both within the family and
in relation to other institutions. In the early eighteenth century, as Kussmaul notes, no
word existed which meant 'only kin' within a household; servants, lodgers, visitors, pupils,
shopmen or unrelated children might well be included [references omitted].
2 4 W. Secombe, "Patriarchy stabilized: the construction of the male breadwinner wage norm in
nineteenth-century Britain" (1986) 11 Social History 53. Similarly, Smith, supra note 7 at 178-79,
suggests:
[a]s we learn more of women's history we find that the emergence of the dependent form
of the family among the working class was far from an abrupt and immediate
consequence of the rise of industrial capitalism. ... The dependency of the mother-
children unit on the male wage earner emerges rather slowly.
25 See, for example D.E. Chunn, "Rehabilitating Deviant Families through Family Courts:
The Birth of 'Socialized' Justice in Ontario, 1920-1940" (1988) 16 Int'l J. Sociology L. 137; M.D.A.
Freeman, "Violence Against Women: Does the Legal System Provide Solutions or Itself Constitute
the Problem?" (1980) 7 Brit. J.L. & Soe'y 215; C.B. Backhouse, "Shifting Patterns in Nineteenth-
Century Canadian Custody Law" in D.H. Flaherty, ed., Essays in the History of Canadian Law, vol. 1
(Toronto: Osgoode Society, 1981) 212; and C. Smart, The Ties That Bind- Law, Marriage, and the
Reproduction of Patriarchal Relations (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984).
2 6 See, for examplc Smart, ibid; "Child Custody, Ideologies and Employment," supra note 17;
Gavigan, supra note 6; MI. Mossman & M. MacLean, "Family Law and Social Welfare: Toward A
New Equality" (1986) 5 Can. J. Fam. L 79 at 104; and K. Arnup, "'Mothers Just Like Others':
Lesbians, Divorce, and Child Custody in Canada" (1989) 3 Can J. Women & L. 18. See also B.
Ryder, "Equality Rights and Sexual Orientation: Confronting Heterosexual Family Privilege"
(1990) 9 Can. J. Fam. L. 39 at 47.
27 See Backhouse, supra note 25; J. Brophy & C. Smart, "From Disregard to Disrepute: The
Position of Women in Family Law" (1981) 9 Feminist Rev. 3; Freeman, supra note 25; "Petit
Treason," supra note 14; and D.H. Currie & M. Kline, "Challenging Privilege: Women, Knowledge
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British socialist feminist to argue that, in the transition to and
consolidation of capitalist social relations, the legal underpinnings of
patriarchy were eroded.28
Dorothy E. Chunn describes this dominant family form:
This model, which remains hegemonic today, is premised upon a conception of 'the
family' as a particular type of household arrangement-a nuclear unity of husband/father,
wife/mother and their children-and, perhaps more importantly, as an ideology based on
the doctrines of domesticity and privacy [references omitted]. 29
In her study of the formation and operation of early family
courts in Ontario, Chunn found that those families that did not fit this
model were to be forced to fit, and their familial privacy was readily
invaded to accomplish the task. "[R]ecalcitrant families, located
primarily among the working and dependent poor, were subject to direct
state regulation in the form of 'socialized' legal coercion."30  She
concludes that
the early family courts in Ontario worked hard to repair and maintain nuclear family
units in danger of disintegration; to buttress the ideology of 'the family' among that
section of the population most resistant to it using mediation and conciliation if possible
and overt coercion as a last resort.31
Closely related to the idea of the family as private domestic
haven has been the idea of the family (subsistence) wage, which emerged
in Britain and spread to North America during the nineteenth century,
and arose in part from trade union demands 32 With it came the idea
and Feminist Struggles" (1991) 2:2 J. Hum. Just. 1 at 5-6.
28 E. Wilson, What Is To Be Done About Violence Against Women? (Harmondsworth,
Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1983) at 42.
29 Supra note 25 at 138.
3 0 /bid.; see also Chunn, supra note 17 at 179. Jane Lewis' research in the British context
reveals a similar picture: "Dealing With Dependency: State Practices and Social Realities, 1870-
1945" in J. Lewis, ed., Women's Welfare Women's Rights (London: Croom Helm, 1983) 17. Lewis, at
21, observes the class implications of both the family wage and its legal enforcement:
In fact the legal obligation to maintain has never been a good guarantee of a married
woman's security, especially if the husband was a low or irregular wage-earner. During
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the courts increasingly tried to make the
working-class husband live up to his legal obligations in order to prevent the wife coming
into the poor law, and middle-class legislators became increasingly aware of and ready to
blame the failure of some working-class men to maintain their wives [references omitted].
31 Supra note 25 at 144.
32 Secombe, supra note 24 at 54-55, draws an important distinction between the emergence of
the individuated wage form, which he argues was inevitable and an integral part of capitalist
development, and the emergence of the ideal of the male breadwinner norm, which was not. Noting
that elsewhere in Europe the male breadwinner triumphed later, Secombe, at 54, nonetheless
argues that "[t]he British case, in this respect, should be considered as one example of a more
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that a working man should earn enough to support his family and "that,
ideally, the wife's place was at home, or at least that any wage earning
she did was of secondary importance."33 The struggle for the family
wage "was conducted at the expense of the woman worker, '34 and there
have been other long-term and far-reaching problems associated with it.
It remained and still remains for many, if not most, working-class people
an unrealized and unrealizable ideal for which women assumed a double
burden of poorly-paid employment, and devalued domestic labour and
child care in the home.35
It is clear, however, as Jane Lewis also reminds us, that the idea
of the family wage was not foisted upon an unwilling or duped working
class, including women trade unionists who were mindful of the double
burden imposed upon women who worked outside the home. The
family wage promised a solution to inadequate wages, marginal
subsistence, and grinding hardship 3 6 The ideal of the family wage, and
the respectability it conferred upon working-class men whose wives "did
not have to work" and married women who "did not have to work"
outside the home, held out a better, easier life for working-class people.
Joan Acker captures the enormity and the complexity of the dilemma,
which is no less apt today:
general trend, unfolding unevenly across the entire developed capitalist world" [emphasis in
original]. See also Barrett & McIntosh, supra note 2; H. Land, "The Family Wage" (1980) 6
Feminist Rev. 55; J. Lewis, "The Working-Class Wife and Mother and State Intervention, 1870-
1918" in J. Lewis, ed., Labour & Love: Women's Experience of Home and Family, 1850-1940
(London: Basil Blackwell, 1986) 99; M. May, "The Historical Problem of the Family Wage: The
Ford Motor Company and the Five Dollar Day" in E.C. DuBois & V.L. Ruiz, eds., Unequal Sisters:
A Multi-Cultural Reader in U.S. Women's History (New York: Routledge, 1990) 275 at 276-79.
33 Lewis, ibid. at 103; see also J. Acker, "Class, Gender, and the Relations of Distribution"
(1988) 13 Signs 473; Barrett & McIntosh, ibid; and May, ibid.
34 Lewis, ibid. at 106. Acker, ibid. at 481, concludes that the wage gap between men and
women "was essential to implementing the ideal of a family wage." Secombe's explanation and
criticism, supra note 24 at 54-55, is equally tough:
the complete triumph of the male breadwinner norm in the working class was not a
foreordained consequence of capitalist growth, but rather was the outcome of struggle in
which an increasingly conservative labour movement ... reacted in a narrow exclusionist
fashion to the very real threat which the mass employment of women as cheap labour
represented to the job security and wage levels of skilled tradesmen [emphasis in
original].
35 Lewis, ibid.:
to the extent that the family wage was never realized, women shouldered a double burden
of household work and paid employment, and received little assistance from legislation
such as national insurance, which assumed female dependency to be the norm.
3 6 1bid at 103-106; Lewis, supra note 30; May, supra note 32; and Acker, supra note 33.
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Economic support through the family wage, to the extent that it was achieved for the
working class, was the result of conflict, reform, resistance and accommodation occurring
in political, trade union, legal, and familial arenas as people tried to cope with the
destructive effects of capitalist development and secure for themselves and their families
economic survival and a satisfying daily life [references omitted].
3 7
The significance of familial ideology was not confined to trade
union analyses and wage demands. In Canada, as Jane Ursel and
Dorothy E. Chunn have illustrated, it came to inform a sweeping range
of legislative initiatives as apparently disparate as child protection and
minimum wages:38
When ideology failed, the recalcitrant-individuals who would not or could not
voluntarily adhere to middle class norms of child-rearing and family life-were subject to
legal coercion [references omitted]. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, federal and provincial governments enacted a spate of criminal and quasi-
criminal legislation that was ostensibly applicable to all children and all families but, in
effect, targeted the non-middle classes. 39
The earliest minimum wage legislation in Canada anticipated
that women who worked would be single, and certainly not supporters of
dependants.40 More profoundly, commitment to the idea of the
patriarchal nuclear family as the exemplary model for the distribution of
wages and social benefits became the basis of all aspects of social,
economic, and legal posture regarding the "family,"41 notwithstanding
significant historical, regional, and ethnic differences in wage forms in
37 Acker, ibia at 485.
38 J. Ursel, "The State and the Maintenance of Patriarchy: A Case Study of Family, Labour
and Welfare Legislation in Canada" in J. Dickinson & B. Russell, eds., Family, Economy & State:
The Social Reproduction Process Under Capitalism (London: Croon Helm, 1986) 150; and Chunn,
supra note 17 at 44-48.
39 Chunn, ibid. at 44.
40 McCallum, supra note 13; M. Hobbs, 'Dead Horses' and 'Muffled Voices': Protective
Legislation, Education and the Minimum Wage for Women in Ontario (M.A. Thesis, University of
Toronto, 1985); and B. Russell, "A Fair or a Minimum Wage? Women Workers, the State, and the
Origins of Wage Regulation in Western Canada" (1991) 28 Labour/Le Travail 59. May, supra note
32 at 278-79, similarly found that at the turn of the century in the United States, "[s]tudies of
minimum wages for working women did not base minimum subsistence needs upon the possible
presence of a family and rarely assumed women would be the financial heads of households,"
notwithstanding poverty studies of the same period, which "revealed that an overwhelming
proportion of destitute families were headed by women."
41 The gendered implications of this commitment cannot be overstated. Acker, supra note 33
at 480, argues that the wage relation must be seen as both an essential component of production
and distribution, a "gendered phenomenon, gendered for men as well as for women." Acker, ibi.
at 484, notes that other kinship based forms of distribution exist in some places in the United States,
notably among African American women's households; nonetheless, the dominant model that
informs distribution either through wages or state benefits is the patriarchal nuclear family model.
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actual households. 42 And, as Chunn has found, "when ideology failed,"
this model was applied coercively to the very section of the population
least able to attain it-the labouring and dependent poor.
43
The commitment to the form and content of familial relations
expressed in the family wage is not a relic of less enlightened times; the
primary responsibility for familial financial support continues to be
regarded as personal, private, and intra-familial,44 which is no less
problematic for poor and working-class women now than it was in the
nineteenth century.
III. DISSIDENCE AND DISSONANCE: DIFFERENT FAMILIES?
Feminists, irrespective of perspective, now acknowledge the
significance of multiplicity and difference in women's experience. In
their recent historical study of the contemporary English Canadian
women's movement, Nancy Adamson, Linda Briskin, and Margaret
McPhail have drawn on and illustrated socialist feminist praxis. They
argue that differences between and among women must be
acknowledged:
socialist feminists challenge the use of an un-differentiated category of woman, for
despite the commonalities of women's experience, their life circumstances differ
considerably on the basis of race, class, and sexual orientation. 45
However, the fact of difference, diversity, and the fragmentation of
experience does not require that theoretical and practical work succumb
to fragmentation as "differences do not by definition mitigate against the
possibility of alliance." 46  However, not all feminists agree that
"experience" continues to be a relevant or unifying analytical concept.47
42 See Russell's discussion, supra note 40 at 66-69.
43 Supra notes 17 and 25.
44 For instance, the Family LawAc R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, s. 30, provides:
Every spouse has an obligation to provide support for himself or herself and for the other
spouse, in accordance with need, to the extent that he or she is capable of doing so.
The Family Benefits Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.2, operates with a different form of intra-familial
premise, as Mossman and MacLean have illustrated, supra note 26.
45 Supra note 11 at 103.
46 Ibid. at 108. See also Fineman, supra note 4, who makes a similar argument in the context
of feminist legal scholarship.
47 See, for example, J.W. Scott, "Experience" in J. Butler & J.W. Scott, eds., Feminists
Theorize The Political (New York: Routledge, 1992) 22; and Williams, supra note 3.
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In other words, the "woman" who appears to have been "constructed"
by feminists is not "every woman."48  Just as Christopher Lasch
characterized the patriarchal nuclear family as a "haven in a heartless
world," 49 so too some50 but not all51 black feminists have argued that the
black family may be a bastion against the impact of racist society. The
diversity of women's experiences of "family" clearly ground some of the
critiques. These arguments on the importance of family have struck a
chord with Canadian feminists who have incorporated the anti-racist
critiques into their work and used them to interrogate Canadian feminist
legal scholarship.52
Didi Herman notes that there is no uniformity in the usage of the
term "family" since some feminists regard it as an ideological construct
and others speak more empirically from their own experiences.53 There
is, of course, no contrived uniformity to be found in the experiences or
48 C. Smart, "Law's Power, the Sexed Body, and Feminist Discourse" (1990) 17 J.L. & Soc'y
194 [hereinafter "Law's Power"]; and C. Smart, Unruly and Docile Bodies: Women in Reproductive
Technology (Department of Sociology, University of Warwick, Coventry, England, 1990)
[unpublished] [hereinafter Unndy and Docile]. This is also expressed in some work as a critique of
"feminist essentialism" or "feminist anti-essentialism": see N. Duclos, "Some Complicating
Thoughts On Same-Sex Marriage" (1991) 1 L. & Sexuality 31; and Williams, supra note 3.
49 Haven in a Heartless World; The Family Beseiged (New York: Basic Books, 1977).
50 See, for example, Carby, supra note 3; and Cook & Watt, supra note 3 at 56-57. See also
bell hooks, who speaks less of family and more of homes made by black women: "Homeplace: A
Site of Resistance" in b. hooks, Yearning: race; gender, and cultural politics (Toronto: Between the
Lines, 1990) 41. hooks, ibi- at 42, characterizes the very creation of homes as an act of resistance
by black women:
We could not learn to love or respect ourselves in the culture of white supremacy, on the
outside; it was there on the inside, in that "homeplace," most often created and kept by
black women, that we had the opportunity to grow and develop, to nurture our spirits.
This task of making a homeplace, of making home a community of resistance, has been
shared by black women globally, especially black women in white supremacist societies.
In this piece, hooks illuminates the struggle to render visible the love, sacrifice, and strength
with which black women have nurtured and sustained their children and kin against the odds of a
racist society. Perhaps most powerful is her interrogation of the implications of Frederick Douglass'
statement that he never knew his mother's care, notwithstanding his own story that when he was a
child, she made a twelve-mile journey after work each night, to lie with him as he went to sleep,
before her walk back for daybreak, and another day's work in the field. Ibid. at 44-45.
51 See, for example; E.F. White, "Listening to the Voices of Black Feminism" (1984) 18
Radical America 7; and G.T. Nain, "Black Women, Sexism and Racism: Black or Antiracist
Feminism?" (1991) 37 Feminist Rev. 1.
52 See, for example; Thornhill, supra note 5 at 159; Kline, supra note 5 at 122; and D. Herman,
"Are We Family?: Lesbian Rights and Women's Liberation" (1990) 28 Osgoode Hall L.J. 789. See
also Susan Boyd's thoughtful engagement with this work, supra note 22.
53 Ibi. at 800.
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writing of women of colour. For instance, the published work of
Aboriginal women resonates of community and nation.54
In the United States, Patricia Hill Collins has suggested that
class differences increasingly mediate the life experiences of African-
American women; the "commonality" of race, gender, and class
oppression "is experienced differently" by middle-class and working-
class African-American women.55 In English Canadian literature, Toni
Williams5 6 and Nitya Duclos5 7 have offered trenchant critiques of
essentialism in feminism, and Himani Bannerji58 has extended her
analysis of the racism of conventional feminism to encompass a critique
of a politics of difference.
In my view, what is exposed is how complex and contentious the
issue of "experience" is within feminism and how reified the "family." A
powerful injunction reminds us there is no unified "experience" that can
be claimed to be a "woman's" 59 and, as such, challenges feminist work
purporting to speak for all women. However, this is not a completely
new issue or struggle for or within feminism. For instance, class
relations and class divisions between women, including feminist activists,
have figured more prominently in the history of the Canadian women's
movement and elsewhere than is often acknowledged. 60 As historian
Judith Walkowitz has illustrated, the nineteenth-century British middle-
class feminist campaign to repeal the contagious diseases legislation to
essentially rescue and save prostitutes from the evils and perils of
prostitution (particularly aristocratic male vice) was frequently met with
the response from working-class prostitutes that, while they too wanted
54 P.A. Monture, "A Vicious Circle: Child Welfare and the First Nations" (1989) 3 Can. .
Women & L. 1; Ontario Native Women's Association, Breaking Free: A Proposal For Change to
Aboriginal Family Violence (Thunder Bay, Ont.: Ontario Native Women's Association, 1989) at 44
and at 58-61; and M.E. Turpel, "Home/Land" (1991) 10 Can. J. Farn. L. 17.
55 Supra note 3 at 65.
5 6 Supra note 3.
57Supra note 48.
5 8 Supra note 3.
59 "Law's Power," supra note 48; Unmly and Docile, supra note 48; Duclos, supra note 48;
Bannerji, ibil; and Williams, supra note 3.
60 See, for example, C. Bacchi, "Divided Allegiances: The Response of Farm and Labour
Women to Suffrage" in L. Kealey, ed., A Not Unreasonable Claim: Women and Reform in Canada,
1880s-1920s (Toronto: The Women's Press, 1979) 89; and S. Mahood, "The Women's Suffrage
Movement in Canada and Saskatchewan" in Women Uniteh An Anthology of the Canadian Women's
Movement (Toronto: Canadian Women's Educational Press, 1972) 21. On differences between
middle-class feminists and their working-class trade union sisters on the issue of protective labour
legislation, see Lewis, supra note 30 at 31.
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the odious laws repealed, they did not want to be saved and/or
transformed into rescued fallen angels.61 In other words, feminist
reformers were often told that they did not speak for the very women to
whom they were committed. Thus, while common cause was made
between "respectable" feminists and their vilified working-class sisters,
class tensions and antagonisms in this successful campaign were not
insignificant.62 The difficulty with the identification and juxtaposition of
apparently differing and divergent experiences is that it can result in the
assertion, rather than the interrogation of the nature of these
experiences. 63 There appears to be a substitution of one experientially-
based feminism for another.64 And yet, if the significance of
"experience" as a relevant analytic concept is to be rethought, as
opposed to jettisoned, it needs to be rethought in its entirety. It surely
cannot be the case that the lives and familial experiences of one group of
women are devoid of contradiction and complexity, whereas others' lives
are characterized only by contradiction and complexity. In my view, the
acknowledgement of the partiality of experience and the need to analyze
all experience is a helpful way to proceed.
One way to analyze this tension is offered by a Marxist
conceptualization of ideology which, as Mich~le Barrett once suggested,
offers "a reading, rather than a direct translation, of the political
meaning of 'experience.' "65 The analysis of "experience" through the
61 See, for example J.R. Walkowitz, Prostitution and Victorian Society: Women, Class, and the
State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980) at 7.
62 IbicL and A. Phillips, Divided Loyalties: Dilemmas of Sex and Class (London: Virago, 1987)
at 80-82.
63 Bannerji, supra note 3 at 82 and at 83, while critical of race blindness in feminist theory and
practice, has reservations about the implications of the "politics of 'difference' ":
In the name of "difference" we tend not to go beyond a rich and direct description of
personal experience to a social analysis which will reveal the sameness of social relations
that constructs the experience of "white" privilege and "black" oppression.
64 Barrett has suggested that within feminism, the concept of "difference" is used in three
different ways: difference as experiential diversity (as in "standpoint" feminism); as positional
meaning (as in post-structuralist feminism); and as sexual difference (in feminist work informed by
psychoanalytic theory): "The Concept of 'Difference?" (1987) 26 Feminist Rev. 29.
65 Ibid. at 32. In the Introduction to Marxist/Feminist Encounter, supra note 7 at xvii, Barrett
notes that the concept of ideology has been replaced by the terms "discourse" and "subjectivity" in
work influenced by Michel Foucault. Barrett, at xviii, while noting the difficulty of transposing
"ideology" beyond its original terrain within Marxism to analyze gender issues, is nonetheless
reluctant to yield the terrain to "discourse," but rather to "develop an approach to a theory of
ideology that loosens the class basis in favour of a more general idea of domination or power, which
can take a variety of forms and agents." I find her observation, at xix, compelling:
[Flamilial ideology can have you by the throat in a way that a discourse of familialism is
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use of the concept of "ideology" may illuminate the significant
dissonance between many (but not all) people's lived experience and the
dominant ideology of the family. Despite this dissonance, paradoxically,
the ideology of the patriarchal nuclear family provides a prism through
which relationships are examined, and the measure against which they
are judged, in spite of shifts that indicate the idealized nuclear family
household may be becoming increasingly less typical.66 Hence, the
distinction between actual households and the ideology of family
households explored by Mich~le Barrett and Mary McIntosh in their
early collaborative work67 continues to be imperative, notwithstanding
the criticism, including their own self criticism, that they failed to
simply not up to. This is because the concept of ideology, whatever its undoubted and
manifest failings, speaks both to and beyond the experience of the individual subject.
66 In Statistics Canada, Housing, Family and Social Statistics Division, Target Groups Project,
Women in Canada: A Statistical Repor4 2nd ed. (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1990) at 8, Statistics
Canada described marriage as "still the most popular form of union" in Canada, but went on to
observe that marriage "no longer has the definite character that it once had." Divorces and
common law relationships have increased. Struggling with this (perhaps to comfort conservative
policy makers), Statistics Canada, ibid, at 7, also found that "even as these "non-traditional" living
arrangements have evolved, the majority of Canadians still live in a family environment."
Despite the outward appearance of normalcy, these statistical reassurances beg the more
important question of the content of familial relations. The most dramatic challenge to the
idealized nuclear family arrangement is the increase in women's labour force participation, and
concomitant demand for affordable, accessible, quality child care. Thus, the assertion of the
prevalence of the form of heterosexual marriages/relationships needs further interrogation. As the
Ontario Report of the Social Assistance Review Committee, Transitions: Report of the Social
Assistance Review Committee (Chair: G. Thomson) (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1988) [hereinafter
Thomson Report] at 92 observed:
The world of work has not kept pace with the tremendous changes in the composition
and nature of families, particularly the changing participation of family members in the
labour force. The most obvious and profound change has been in the role of women.
The Canadian National Child Care Study: parental work patterns and child care needs by D.S.
Lero et aL, (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1992) at 22 recently confirmed that in 1990 most women
(58.5 per cent), even those with young children, were in the labour force or actively looking for
work. The study, at 17, also found that the majority of families with preschool-age children were
dual-earner families and that "established images of family life no longer match reality."
The Thomson Report, at 92, estimated that by the year 2000 there will be equal numbers of
men and women in the labour force. The extent of poverty found in households led by single parent
women (85 per cent of all single parent families in Ontario) is as scandalous as it is well
documented: see, for example, D.P. Ross & R. Shillington, The Canadian Fact Book on
Poverty-1989 (Ottawa: Canadian Council on Social Development, 1990); and Canada, National
Council of Welfare, Women and Poverty Revisited: a report (Ottawa: National Council of Welfare,
1990). However, the Thomson Report, at 30, found that:
even with the many hardships poor women face-including delinquent child support
payments, lesser access to contributory pensions, lack of affordable child care, and
limited job prospects--only a third of the province's female-headed families require [or
perhaps more accurately, receive] social assistance.
6 7 Supra note 7.
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adequately identify and analyze the range and diversity of British
households.6A
Douglas Hay has suggested that an ideology has both elasticity
and generality, and thus "remains a reservoir of belief throughout the
society and flows into the gaps of individual protest."69 The struggles of
people who can never fit into the ideal of the nuclear family illuminate,
rather than negate, what some feminists identify as the oppressive
implications of the idealization and romanticization of the nuclear family;
the "reservoir of belief' that it offers sanctuary in a hard world. The
"strength, affirmation, and resistance"70 that women of colour attribute to
their often non-nuclear families similarly illustrates that many people
(black people, Aboriginal people, poor people of any race) have
experienced neither their households as cherished nuclear havens nor
the promise of a family or living wage. The denial of family life to black
men and women workers in South Africa 71 and often to immigrants 72
and to foreign (most notably, in Canada, female domestic73) workers in
68 See, for example, Carby, supra note 3; M. Barrett & M. McIntosh, "Ethnocentrism and
Socialist-Feminist Theory" (1985) 20 Feminist Rev. 23; and the ensuing responses principally in
succeeding volumes of the Feminist Review.
69 "Property, Authority and Criminal Law" in D. Hay et al, eds., Albion's Fatal Tree: Crime
and Society in Eighteenth-Century England (London: Allen Lane, 1975) 17 at 55.
70 Herman, supra note 52 at 799 [emphasis added].
71 There is currently underway a serious discussion within the African National Congress on
whether and, if so, how to reconstruct family law in a democratic, post-apartheid South Africa. See
A. Sachs, "The Family in a Democratic South Africa-Its Constitutional Position" (1990) 8 Agenda
40; and A. Charman, "A Response to Albie Sachs: What is the Family?" (1990) 8 Agenda 55.
72 The commitment to family reunification articulated in Canadian immigration law and policy
is both limited, in terms of the operative definition of family class, and as the painful experience of
Chinese Canadians attests, of relatively recent provenance. See, for example, T. Adilman, "A
Preliminary Sketch of Chinese Women and Work in British Columbia 1858-1950" in B.K. Latham
& R.J. Pazdro, eds., Not Just Pin Money: Selected Essays On The History Of Women's Work In British
Columbia (Victoria, B.C.: Camosun College, 1984) 54; and C. Backhouse, Petticoats and Prejudices.
Women and Law in Nineteenth Century Canada (Toronto: Women's Press, 1991) 217. For analyses
of British immigration law and policy, see Parmar, supra note 3 at 240-41; J. Bhabha, F. Kug & S.
Shutter, eds., Worlds Apart: Women Under Immigration and Nationality Law (London: Pluto, 1985);
and Barrett & McIntosh, supra note 68 at 42-43.
73 S. Arat-Kog, "Importing Housewives: Non-Citizen Domestic Workers and the Crisis of the
Domestic Sphere in Canada" in M. Luxton, H. Rosenberg & S. Arat-Kog, eds., Through the Kitchen
Window: The Politics of Home and Family, 2d ed. (Toronto: Garamond, 1990) 81. The requirement
that foreign domestic workers live with, that is, in the homes of their employers, invariably means
that the domestic worker must come alone. Once in the home of her employer, Arat-Kog suggests
that the domestic worker has an ambiguous status. She is neither a wife nor a full-fledged worker
with corresponding rights and privileges: "The domestic worker today is like a stranger, 'being in the
family, but not of it.' She is involved in the work of a house but not the pleasures and intimacies of
a home" [references omitted; emphasis in original]. Ibid. at 86.
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the formally non-apartheid world, combined with the policing of poor
and Aboriginal people through child welfare and welfare legislation
more generally, are only the most obvious examples.
In fact, it would seem that the idealized nuclear family, premised
as it is upon assumptions of privatized female dependence and
domesticity, is especially problematic for black women in the British and
American contexts. Both Hazel Carby and Prathiba Parmar have
illustrated that black and Asian women in Britain have long been
integrated into the labour force, and that black women are in fact often
not dependent upon men.74 The oral histories of black women in
Ontario suggest that this may be the case in Canada as well.75 Juliet
Cook and Shantu Watt 76 in Britain, and Maxine Baca Zinn77 and
Patricia Hill Collins78 in the United States, have similarly shown how
deeply interrelated class and racial inequalities are in black women's
lives and, of course, the lives of their children. These inequalities affect
not only the work these women do, but also the work and wages of the
men in their lives.
However, the difficulty with black women's independence is that
it is both belied and denied by the state through the premises and
definitions of, at the very least, welfare and immigration law. In other
words, irrespective of their varied experiences of family, work, and
culture, and their often de facto independence from men, poor women,
including poor visible minority and immigrant women, and even poor
lesbians, "cannot 'opt out' of" the law,79 and the legal relations of
74 Carby, supra note 3 at 219-20; and Parmar, supra note 3. See also Barrett & McIntosh,
supra note 68.
75 D. Brand, No Burden to Carry: Narratives of Black Working Women in Ontario 1920s-1950s
(Toronto: Women's Press, 1991).
76 Supra note 3.
77 "Minority Families in Crisis: The Public Discussion" in K.V. Hansen & IJ. Philipson, eds.,
Women, Class, and the Feminist Imagination: A Socialist-Feminist Reader (Philadelphia: Temple
University Press, 1990) 363; and "Family, Race, and Poverty in the Eighties" (1989) 14 Signs 856.
78 Supra note 3 at 59-65. Collins suggests this is especially true of the post-World War II era
in the United States.
79 As Carol Smart and Julia Brophy expressed it in "Locating Law: a discussion of the place of
law in feminist politics," the introduction to J. Brophy & C. Smart, Women-in-Law: Explorations in
Law, Family and Sexuality (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985) 1 at 1. With respect to lesbians
in poverty, seeJhordan C. v. MaryK, 224 Cal.Rptr. 530 (Cal.App.1 Dist. 1986). This case involved a
judicial determination that a man who donated sperm to a lesbian, which resulted in pregnancy and
the subsequent birth of a little boy, was a father. However, four years prior to the Court of Appeal's
decision, he had been ordered to reimburse the County of Sonoma for public assistance paid for the
child's support and to make future support payments. Ibid, at 533.
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enforced dependency. The state's legislatively-expressed commitment to
the primacy of "private" responsibility for spousal or child support is
nothing less than a commitment to state-enforced patriarchal relations
of private male responsibility and female dependence.80
This commitment is graphically illustrated in the context of
Canadian immigration law where women seeking to immigrate to
Canada are required to acquire the status of dependency in the process
of being sponsored to Canada by a Canadian citizen or permanent
resident, most often a spouse or fianc6.8 1 The significance of
sponsorship is principally financial: the sponsor undertakes to provide
for the immigrant8 2 in order to ensure that the latter will not become a
burden on the Canadian state. These sponsorship agreements, to which
the sponsored immigrant is not formally a party, are designed to ensure
private financial support and to limit a sponsored immigrant's access to
social assistance. This fact alone may explain why newly arrived
immigrant women tend to be employed, in larger numbers than
Canadian-born women, in the textile industries-at jobs characterized by
low wages, piece work, home work, and virtually unregulated working
conditions.83
80 Fudge, supra note 11 at 523. See also J. Fudge, "The Privatization of the Costs of Social
Reproduction: Some Recent Charter Cases" (1989) 3 Can. J. Women & L. 246.
81 Immigration Regulations, C.R.C., c. 940, s. 41. See, for example, Canadian Advisory
Council of the Status of Women, Immigrant Women in Canada: A Policy Perspective (Background
Paper 1988-1E) by S.B. Seward & K. McDade (Ottawa: Canadian Advisory Council of the Status of
Women, 1988); and D. McIntosh, "Defining 'Family' A Comment on the Family Reunification
Provisions in the Immigration Act" (1987) 3 J.L. & Soc. Pol'y 104.
82 Immigration Regulations, ibid, at s. 43(5)(a). The implication of this requirement for the
poor must not be missed. Poor Canadian citizens and permanent residents are less able than more
economically advantaged members of the community to sponsor their family members. As
Ontario, Advisory Group on New Social Assistance Legislation, Back on Track- First Report of the
Advisory Group on New Social Assistance Legislation (Toronto: Advisory Group on New Social
Assistance Legislation, 1991) (Chair A. Moscovitch) [hereinafter Moscovitch Report] noted at 85:
Sponsorship breakdown is by no means the only issue to be resolved. For example, we
are also concerned that low-income immigrants to Canada are often unable to reunite
their families here because they fall below an established income level. That could
mean, for example, that a parent on social assistance could not sponsor a spouse to come
to this country when together they might be able to make enough income to get the
family off social assistance.
83 See Seward & McDade, supra note 81 at 14-18; R. Ng, "Immigrant Women in Canada: A
Socially Constructed Category" (1986) 15 Resources for Feminist Research 13 [hereinafter
"Immigrant Women"]; and R. Ng, "Immigrant Women and Institutionalized Racism" in S. Burt, L
Code & L. Dorney, eds., Changing Patterns: Women in Canada (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart,
1988) 184. On the unregulated state of working conditions, notwithstanding the existence of
provincial employment standards legislation, see "Labour Law's Little Sister," supra note 13 at 84.
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If the marriage ends, or if at an early point in the process the
sponsor elects to withdraw the sponsorship, the precarious position of
the sponsored immigrant woman cannot be overstated. If the marriage
has been the site of violence by her sponsoring spouse, the woman will
nevertheless be required to pursue him for support unless she can
convince welfare officials that her personal safety is at risk, and that the
relationship with the sponsor has really ended. Thus, for many
immigrant women in Canada, especially the poor, the opportunity to be
independent from their spouses, both in fact and in law, is virtually
impossible.8 4 The presumption of women's familial dependence once
again finds legislative enforcement irrespective of a woman's actual
wishes, needs, or experience.
IV. THE PROBLEM OF THE HETEROSEXUAL FAMILY FORM:
HETEROSEXISM OR HETEROSEXUAL PRIVILEGE?
There are a number of different sources for my next area of
concern-the call to legalize and thereby legitimize the lesbian and gay
household. A great impetus for current interest in formal recognition
may derive, in part, from the devastation of AjDs, as well as the
heartbreaking struggles that some gay men have had during, and in the
aftermath of, the death of their loved ones. The expression "longtime
companion" seems to understate the relationship. And while I find the
phrase evocative of a voluntary egalitarian intimacy, one recognizes the
perceived or indeed experienced invisibility of even those surviving
companions who could be named with the "real" family as survivors.
In Canada, the equality guarantee of section 15 of the Charter
has fueled some of the litigation efforts by gay men and lesbians seeking
redress for heterosexist discrimination. Indeed, thus far, it seems that
the litigants have eked from the courts the concession that sexual
orientation may be a protected ground.85 However, it is the lesbian and
gay claim to "family status" that has confounded the courts, troubled
some feminists, 8 6 and bedevilled legislators. In Canada, dissident
84 See Immigration Regulations, supra note 81 at s. 43(5)(a). Ng, in "Immigrant Women,"
ibid at 187-189, has also made this point forcefully.
85 Veysey v. Canada (Correctional Service) (1990), 109 N.R. 300 (F.C.A.D.); Brown v. British
Columbia (Minister of Health) (1990), 42 B.C.L.R. (2d) 294 (S.C.); and Haig v. Canada (1992), 94
D.L.R. (4th) 1 (Ont. CA.).
86 Clearly I include myself here. For differently framed "troubled" responses, see Herman,
supra note 52; M. Minow, "Redefining Families: Who's In and Who's Out?" (1991) 62 U. Colo. L
Rev. 269; Duclos, supra note 48; R. Robson & S.E. Valentine, "Lov(h)ers: Lesbians as Intimate
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Conservative members in the previous Parliament were among the most
vocal, and even fashioned themselves into a "family caucus" to demand
that a legislated definition of the "traditional family" be added to federal
human rights legislation in order to put an end to the audacious claims.
8 7
At this writing, two cases have elicited the most discussion. In Ontario,
Karen Andrews' courageous and spirited "We are Family" campaign
made important gains in the trade union movement.88 Andrews, armed
with the support of a Report of the Ombudsman of Ontario8 9 and the
Canadian Union of Public Employees, sought to have her partner and
their two children considered a family unit under the Ontario Health
Insurance Plan. Specifically, she wanted to obtain "dependant
coverage" for the other three members of her household. 9 0 In
dismissing her application, McRae J. indicated that his research yielded
only definitions of spouse as an opposite sex partner.91 Writing with a
more critical eye, Bruce Ryder amplifies this point:
The amount of legal architecture that has gone into building the ideal family and
supporting heterosexuality is staggering-hundreds of pieces of legislation, thousands of
regulations, rules, by-laws and judicial decisions. This plethora of government activity
promotes the idea that there is only one legitimate sexual identity, only one legitimate
family form, and thus ensures that all those people living outside these legally and
ideologically created norms are constructed as deviant [references omitted].
92
In a case decided by the Supreme Court of Canada, Brian
Mossop challenged his employer's denial of a one-day bereavement
leave to attend the funeral of his lover's father. 93 The terms of Mossop's
employment were governed by a collective bargaining agreement. The
Partners and Lesbian Legal Theory" (1990) 63 Temple L. Rev. 511; and C. Allen, Remarks (LEAF
Symposium, Sexual Orientation Panel, 14-16 February 1992) [unpublished].
87 Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6; G. York, "Homosexual rights issue
threatening to split Conservative caucus" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (18 April 1992) A6.
8 8 Andrews v. Ontario (Minister of Health) (1988), 49 D.L.R. (4th) 584 (H.C.) [hereinafter
Andrews]. This case is discussed at length by Herman, supra note 52, and Ryder, supra note 26.
89 Ontario, Office of the Ombudsman, Report of the Ombudsman's Opinion, Reasons Therefore,
and Recommendation Following His Investigation into the Complaint of Ms. Karen Andrews, by D.G.
Hill (20 February 1987).
90 The relevant legislation defined "dependant" as "spouse of an insured person, or (ii) a child
of an insured person who is dependent for support upon the insured person [and under 21J."
R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 452, s. 1(c); and Health InsuranceAct R.S.O. 1980, c. 197, s. 1(a).
91 He had consulted at least four dictionaries and the Equality Rights Statute Law Amendment
Act; 1986, S.O. 1986, c. 64, which listed thirty-three statutes; no cases on this point were cited in his
judgment. Andrews, supra note 88 at 587-88.
92 Supra note 26 at 47.
93 Canada (A.G.) v. Mossop, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 554, aff'g (1990), 71 D.L.R. (4th) 661
(F.C.A.D.) [hereinafterMossop, cited to D.L.R.].
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agreement's bereavement leave provision defined immediate family to
include, among others, spouse, common law spouse, and father-in-law.
The operative definition of common law spouse in Article 2.01 of the
agreement was significant to Mossop because, except for the opposite
sex requirement, his relationship was a perfect fit:
a "common-law spouse" relationship is said to exist when, for a continuous period of at
least one year, an employee has lived with a person of the opposite sex, publicly
represented that person to be his/her spouse, and lives and intends to continue to live
with that person as if that person were his/her spouse. 9 4
The tribunal which heard his human rights complaint found that
the undefined term "family status" in the Canadian Human Rights Act9s
included a homosexual relationship, that Mossop had experienced
discrimination on the basis of family status, and ordered that the
discrimination be corrected by incorporating same-sex couples into the
definition of common law spouse relationship in the collective
agreement. 96 When the government's appeal was heard by the Federal
Court of Appeal, it is fair to say that Marceau J.A. was flabbergasted by
the complaint, by the result before the tribunal, and by the indignity
done to "the core meaning conveyed by the word" family.97 While the
tone of the majority judgment was less inflamed, all members of the
bench agreed that Parliament had expressly decided not to prohibit
discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation, that Mossop's claim
to "family status" in this case was a proxy for his real ground (sexual
orientation) and, that in any event, "family status" did not include sexual
orientation. The victory and subsequent defeat could not have been
clearerY8 However, as hailed as the Tribunal's decision was by Mossop
and his supporters, the nature of that initial victory needs to be
understood. The distinction between real spouses and common law
spouses was accepted, as were the "hoops" through which common law
spouses have to jump in order to establish the very existence, not to
mention legitimacy, of their relationships.
94 Quoted in Mossop, iaid. at 665, per Marceau J.A.
95 Supra note 87 at s. 3(1).
96 Mossop, supra note 93 at 667.
9 7 Mossop, ibid. at 673, per Marceau J.A.
9 8 See D. Herman, " 'Sociologically Speaking': Law, Sexuality and Social Change" (1991) 2:2
J. Hum. Just. 57.
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The pain, the grief, the compelling facts, the obvious
discrimination,99 and judicial subscription to familial ideology are
undeniable. Nonetheless, my questions remain: do lesbians and gay men
really need a "spouse in the house?" Is the fact that the threshold
definition of "spouse" in law as a person of the opposite sex best
characterized as an instance, or source,100 of "heterosexual privilege?"
Would this form of legalization of lesbian and gay relationships correct
the injustices of a heterosexist society? Is the definition of "spouse" in
other respects neutral? Can the social and legal concept of "spouse" be
plucked from its heterosexual familial context and dropped into the
lesbian and gay context? And, if so, should it?
For the editors of the Harvard Law Review in their recent review
of American law (Sexual Orientation and the Law) these questions
address non-issues:
Marriage has always been regarded as a central institution in American society.
Alongside its strong symbolic meaning to the partners, marriage bestows concrete legal
advantages on the couple: tax benefits, standing to recover damages for certain torts
committed against spouses, rights to succession, and insurance benefits to name a few
[references omitted]. 1 01
And, "[m]arriage is also constitutionally protected because it promotes
familial and social stability" [references omitted].P 2 They confidently
conclude that "same-sex marriages are wholly consistent with the
theoretical and policy justifications behind the right to marry."103 And
thereby, they render unthinkable and invisible women and men who are
critical of the values ascribed to marriage, who are sceptical of its
promised benefits and protections, who are attentive to the historic
inequalities of marriage, and who consciously choose not to be spouses.
In other words, they resist the apparently irresistible appeal of a
dominant ideology of this society, notwithstanding that for some, the
alleviation of parental mortification because they are "living in sin"
99 See Ryder's thorough review of Canadian law, supra note 26; see also Duclos, supra note 48.
100 Ryder, ibidL
101 The Editors of Harvard Law Review, Sexual Orientation and the Law (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1990) at 95.
102 Ibid. at 97.
1 03 bid. Although I am sure that they would not embrace the analysis of the Editors of the
Harvard Law Review, see also M. Eaton & C. Petersen, "Comment: Andrews v. Ontario (Minister
of Health)" (1987-1988) 2 Can. J. Women & L. 416 at 421, where they nonetheless suggest that
"[t]he living arrangement between Ms. Andrews and Ms. Trenholn does not substantially interfere
with the state's interest in the political economy of the family unit or in the reproduction of human
capital."
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through the absolution of a legal marriage seems a small price to pay for
the promise of familial peace and freedom from parental interference.
As I have suggested above, feminists and lesbians writing with a
feminist perspective tend to be wary in their own analyses. Didi
Herman, for instance, worries that "[b]y appropriating familial ideology,
lesbians and gay men may be supporting the very institutional structures
that create and perpetuate women's oppression." 10 4 Herman takes no
comfort from this position:
One could conclude that the response to the experience of oppression cannot lie in a
retreat into family, whatever the form, and certainly not into the discourse of familial
ideology. Our families may be different in that they are not premised on the
subordination of women by men. ... [However] we must also reconcile ourselves with the
reality that for some, families and oppositional familial ideologies are important sites of
resistance and affirmation.105
But, my own questions remain. Is there not more to "the family"
than different familial experiences? And while, as Nitya Duclos also
insists, there is no essential family, and surely no essential lesbian or gay
family 06-there is something beyond the sum of contesting dissident
experiences and beliefs, something against which we all are measured.
The premises of "the family" neither begin nor end with the legislated
definition of "spouse."
This is clearly illustrated when one interrogates the notion of
"heterosexual privilege." It implies symmetry when asymmetry is surely
a more accurate characterization of spouses in the familial context,107
notwithstanding the contrived formal equality, gender neutrality, and
contractual language of family law legislation. An analysis of the
concept "spouse," which concludes that it confers privilege is, in my
opinion, too narrow, despite its progressive and critical complexion.
Heterosexual privilege posits a bifurcated gender-neutral dyad of
homosexuality/heterosexuality. It is resonant of anti-discriminatory
language such as in/out, or inclusion/exclusion. Ruth Colker, for
instance, explicitly draws upon the imagery of segregation when she
104 Supra note 52 at 797.
105 Ibd. at 803-04.
106 Supra note 48.
107 This is inspired by Freeman's early piece, supra note 25 at 236-238.
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characterizes marriage as a restricted club (to which she reluctantly
belongs).108
The focus on the specific contexts of lesbian and gay
relationships has paradoxically decontextualized heterosexual
relationships. More precisely, it has decontextualized and declawed
heterosexism. The analysis must be extended to explain core familial
phenomena in our country such as: wife assault and child abuse; the
presumed dependency of a woman in need of either social assistance or
a job upon a man; the enforced dependency, or poverty, of many
sponsored immigrant women; and the terrifying isolation of the battered
woman whose first language is not one of the official languages. The
dearth of quality and accessible child care and safe, affordable housing;
the modicum of economic and physical security for women who leave
unhappy or violent relationships; and the different class positions
reflected and reinforced in different legislation, must also be explained.
The concept of heterosexual privilege does not even begin to do this. It
simply cannot cope with the enormity of the family as an ideological
construct and, as a result, it is neither a helpful analytical concept nor an
accurate descriptive tool.
While there has been a consistent and too long examined
reference to a "person of the opposite sex" at the heart of the legal
definition of spouse, married women, common law wives, and single
mothers have historically been dealt with differently in family and
welfare law. Historically and presumptively today, family law legislation
restricts the right to matrimonial property to legally married spouses.10 9
A resort to the concept of constructive trust is had when a woman's real
trust is betrayed by a common law spouse.110 In the 1970s, as Mary
108 "Marriage" (1991) 1 Yale J.L. & Feminism 321. Colker, at 321, collapses the analytical
concepts of ideology, coercion, and economic compulsion, in her exploration of "some of the
coercive elements of our society that would compel evefi me, a committed feminist, to marry." It
became clear to her that if she and the man in her life did not marry, "society would treat us and
[their hoped for] child coercively." /bid. at 323. As an American academic, she could not readily
find employment in a Canadian university unless she married her Canadian partner and "became a
Canadian." Ibid at 323. The United States has "very restrictive immigration rules" and her
partner would lose his health insurance. Ibid Not one amounts to coercion, nor do they in their
Sum.
109 See, for example, the Family Law Act, supra note 44, Parts I (Family Property) and II
(Matrimonial Home), which operate with a definition of spouse as "either of a man and woman
who, (a) are married to each other." bia. at s. 1(1).
110 See the landmark case, Pettkus v. Becker, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 834. However, it is important
to remember that this case really turned on the woman's enormous contribution of nineteen years
of unpaid labour to the enterprise, and not the significance of her relationship with her common law
husband. Paradoxically, this has helped at least one lesbian who, while unable to convince the court
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Morton has observed, the ideological climate shifted 1l Canadian
legislators felt compelled to correct the most obvious inequities-the
definition of spouse in many provincial family relations statutes was
relaxed for the purposes of child and spousal support.112
Current conventional wisdom is that common law spouses are
just like real spouses "in law." In fact, even the most cursory
examination of the legislation and case law in the area of pensions,
insurance, and survivor's benefits reveals that there is no one definition
of common law spouse, and no single legislative approach regarding
it.113 Indeed, pity a surviving common law partner who comes up against
a legal, or essentially real, widow for survivor's benefits under the
Canada Pension Plan. 114 For many, access or relegation to the definition
of "spouse" is a question of class. As an elderly homeless woman,
attempting to establish that her relationship with her deceased "special
friend" measured up to the definition of "common law spouse" in the
Canada Pension Plan, expressed it, "We just loved each other. We
that her estranged lesbian partner was either her spouse or parent to her two children (conceived by
artificial insemination during their relationship), was nonetheless able to rely upon Pettkus v. Becker
to extract a declaration that she had a beneficial interest in property held in the other woman's
name. See also Anderson v. Luoma (1986), 50 R.F.L. (2d) 127 (B.C.S.C.).
1 1 1 Supra note 17 at 259.
112 See, for example, Family LawAc, 1986, s. 29, which provides this expanded definition of
spouse:
"spouse" means a spouse as defined in subsection 1(1) [see supra note 109], and in
addition includes either of a man and woman who are not married to each other and have
cohabited,
(a) continuously for a period of not less than three years, or
(b) in a relationship of some permanence, if they are the natural or adoptive parents of a
child.
113 See FamilyAllowancesAct, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-I, s. 2(1); Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-
2, s. 2(1); Workers' Compensation Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. W.11, s. 1(1); Criminal Injwy Compensation
Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 83, s. 1(1); Workers Compensation Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 437, s. 1; and B.C.
Reg. 479/76, s. 2(18). See, for example, Canada (A.G.) v. Mossop, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 554, per
L'Heureux-Dub6 (dissenting) at 589ff. See also Factum of Egale et aL, the Interveners, filed in the
Supreme Court of Canada in the late spring 1992, in Canada (A.G.) v. Mossop, ibiL (on file with
the author as well as the Court).
1 1 4 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-8, s. 64. See, for example, Canada (Minister of National Health and
Welfare) v. Szekeley (1983), C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8915 (P.A.B.); and Canada (Minister of National
Health & Welfare) v. Krejnik (1985), C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8960 (P.A.B.). For a case where the
presumption in favour of the legal widow was displaced because the deceased contributor had
publicly represented his common law spouse as his "wife," see Canada (Minister of National Health
& Welfare) v. Leitch (12 June 1986), Appeal CP 879 (PA.B.).
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planned to marry, but we were always too sick or too poor. We had no
fixed address. How do you get married on the street?" 1 5
V. THE CASE OF WOMEN IN WELFARE LAW: SPOUSE ON
THE LAM OR LOUSE IN THE HOUSE?
For Canadian women, especially sole support mothers on social
assistance, the definition of "spouse" has always been relatively relaxed
and intrusively enforced. Feminist scholars have illustrated the myriad
ways in which the fundamental premises of this area of law have both
assumed and enforced women's dependency upon men.116 Not only
have poor women been expected to conform to this model of
appropriate family life and responsibilities but, to ensure that they were
deserving, they have also been historically subjected to legislatively
mandated harassment by virtue of the notorious "spouse in the house"
rule. Prior to 1987 in Ontario, the courts were fairly routinely presented
with appeals from the Social Assistance Review Board (sARB), which
required a determination of whether a particular relationship was
sufficiently conjugal to warrant the characterization "spousal." 117 The
Ontario Court of Appeal attempted to define the issue in Re Warwick:
115 Evidence of Olive Cowan before Review Committee under the Canada Pension Plan,
Cowan v. Canada (Minister of National Health & Welfare) (October 1989), unreported decision of
Review Committee at 3. The Committee's decision to allow Mrs. Cowan's claim was appealed by
Canada Pension Plan and ultimately set aside under the terms of a settlement reached between the
parties. This unreported decision is on file with the author.
116 EJ. Abner, The Merits of the Use of Constitutional Litigation to Unravel the Fabric of The
Feminization of Poverty in Canada (LLM. Thesis, York University, 1989); J. Brenner, "Toward a
Feminist Perspective on Welfare Reform" (1989) 2 Yale J. L. & Feminism 99 at 107-09; J.
Brenner, "Feminist Political Discourses: Radical versus Liberal Approaches to the Feminization of
Poverty and Comparable Worth" in KV. Hansen & IJ. Philipson, eds., supra note 77, 491; M.
Leighton, "'Handmaids' Tales: Family Benefits Assistance and the Single-Mother-Led Family"
(1987) 45 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 324; J. Lewis, "Towards a Framework for Analyzing the Position of
Women under Income Security Policies" in E.D. Pask, K.E. Mahoney & C.A. Brown, eds.,
Women, the Law and the Economy (Toronto: Butterworths, 1985) 145; Mossman & MacLean, supra
note 26; and Smith, supra note 7 at 189.
117 See the line of cases from Re Proc and Minister of Community and Social Services (1975), 53
D.L.R. (3d) 512 (Ont. Div. Ct.); Re Waiwick and Minister of Community and Social Services (1978)
21 O.R. (2d) 528 (C.A.) [hereinafter Re Warwick]; Willis v. Ontario (Minister of Community and
Social Services) (1983), 40 O.R. (2d) 287 (Div.Ct.); Re Pitts and Director of Family Benefits Branch of
the Ministry of Community and Social Services (1985), 51 O.R. (2d) 302 (Div. Ct.) [hereinafter Re
Pitts]; to Re Burton and Minister of Community and Social Services (1985), 52 O.R. (2d) 211 (Div.
Ct.).
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[m]arriage involves a complex group of human inter-relationships--conjugal, sexual,
familial and social as well as economic ... marriage is more than a matter of economics
and involves elements broadly described by the words cohabitation and consortium.
118
In Re Pitts, 119 the Ontario Divisional Court held that a two-stage inquiry
was involved. If there was, in fact, no cohabitation, the inquiry ended. If
cohabitation was found, the test developed earlier in Re Warwick was
applied.
Welfare advocates have actively resisted and campaigned to
prevent the kind of inquisitorial analysis of recipients' personal and
sexual lives that has occurred in lesbian and gay cases. 120 In 1987, the
regulations to the Ontario family benefits legislation 121 were amended,
reflecting in part this concern. In addition to the now conventional
definitions of "spouse," a new definition of "spouse" was introduced: "a
person of the opposite sex to the applicant or recipient who has resided
continuously with the applicant or recipient for a period of not less than
three years." 122
An old test was withdrawn: "In determining whether or not a
person is a spouse within the meaning of this Regulation, sexual factors
shall not be investigated or considered."123
And a new caveat with a new burden was introduced:
Subclause (1)(d)(iv) does not apply to a person who has resided continuously for a period
of not less than three years with the applicant or recipient and the applicant or recipient
provides evidence to the Director that the economic, social and familial aspects of the
118 bid. at 537.
119 Supra note 117 at 308.
120 See Didi Herman's discussion, supra note 52 at 797-99, of the examination-in-chief, cross-
examination, and re-examination of Margrit Eichler in Karen Andrews' case [Andrews, supra note
88].
121 R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 318, now R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 366 [hereinafter Regulation 318]; and
Family Benefits Ac supra note 44. In the other subsections of the Regulation, as amended by 0.
Reg. 589187, s. 1(1), the now conventional definitions of spouse were retained:
(i) a person of the opposite sex to an applicant or recipient who together with the
applicant or recipient have declared to the Director or a welfare administrator
appointed under section 4 of the General WelfareAssistanceAct that they are spouses,
(ii) a person who is required under the provisions of a court order or domestic contract
to support the applicant, recipient or any of his or her dependent children,
(iii) a person who has an obligation to support the applicant, recipient or any of his or her
dependent children under section 30 or 31 of the Family Law Act, 1986
notwithstanding a domestic contract or other agreement between the person and the
applicant or recipient whereby they purport to waive or release such obligation to
support [hereinafter Regulation 1(1)(d) (iii)].
122 Regulation 318, s. 1(1)(d)(iv), as am. by 0. Reg. 589/87, s. 1(1).
12 3 Ibi at s. (la), as am. by 0. Reg. 638/86,s. 1(2).
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relationship between the person and the applicant or recipient were such that the
continuous residing did not amount to cohabitation.
1 2 4
These legislative changes to the definition of "spouse" were
intended to bring family benefits law more into line with family law
principles,1 25 and to eliminate the automatic presumption that a man's
presence in a house was a fairly reliable marker of a spousal relationship.
As long as the man in the house is not the father of the woman's
children, the couple has a three-year grace period before he is deemed
to be her spouse. The woman must then provide evidence to satisfy the
family benefits officials that the relationship does not warrant the label
"spousal." Restricting the consideration of sexual factors was
undoubtedly intended to protect the privacy of family benefits recipients;
however, as I will illustrate below, this reform has had contradictory
results.
Erika Abner's assessment of this reform is that the position of
women receiving family benefits improved only marginallyP 6 Beyond
this, she argues, "welfare administrators appear to expect more from
men by way of support than is frequently ordered by judges for support
applications under family law provisions." 127  Furthermore, by
operation of the presumption of a spousal relationship following not less
than three years' cohabitation with a person of the opposite sex, the onus
is placed on a recipient to show that the social, economic, and familial
aspects of the relationship are such that it does not amount to
cohabitation.
Two recent "spouse in the house" cases decided under the
amended Ontario Family Benefits Act and regulations 28 will illustrate
124 Ibi. at s. 1(1b), as am. by 0. Reg. 589/87, s. 1(2).
125 This was recommended by the Thomson Report, supra note 66 at 161. Recently, this
recommendation has been taken up and extended by the Moscovitch Report, supra note 82 at 87:
"We would argue that couples of the same sex should be treated the same way as those of the
opposite sex for the purpose of determining a benefit unit for social assistance." The Moscovitch
Report recommended that the Minister of Community and Social Services "press the Attorney
General to implement changes in the Family Law Act to extend laws relating to support obligations
for couples of the same sex."
1 2 6 Supra note 116 at 54.
12 7 1bid. at 50.
128 Family BenefdtsAc4 supra note 44 at s. 20, as am. by S.O. 1989, c. 72, s. 20; and Regulation
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the paradox that resulted. In the first,129 C.B. separated from her
husband and moved into her mother's home with her children. Almost
immediately, the mother herself had to move, and C.B. and her children
were faced with the task of finding yet another home. Her estranged
husband located an apartment for her in a house where he also proposed
to live. The sAmn, which subsequently heard her appeal, noted that she
agreed to the unusual arrangement because of the difficulties in securing
affordable and safe housing. She would rent the upstairs unit, while her
husband rented the downstairs, to which the landlord had said he would
add a kitchen and bathroom. 30 However, the landlord never fulfilled
his promise, and consequently the husband had to use his wife's kitchen
and bathroom. Although he had agreed to pay child support, the
Tribunal noted that he was seldom working so nothing was paid!3 1 The
evidence before SARB was that she had been "emotionally, financially
and practically a single parent," had made all the arrangements for
daycare and school, and was regarded in the community as a single
parent. She did not have joint meals, food, or entertainment with her
spouse, but felt she had no choice but to accept the living arrangement
because of the then low vacancy rate and high rents. She was declared
by the Director of Income Maintenance to be ineligible as she was living
with her spouse within the meaning of the Family Benefits regulations.
C.B. appealed unsuccessfully to the sAB, which found that she
had always been honest and straightforward with the family benefits
officials, but nonetheless reluctantly held:
while the Board may accept the evidence given by the Appellant that there is no longer a
relationship that most people would call spousal between her and this person, the fact
that he is the father of both children and has the obligation to support them, makes him
her spouse under this legislation.1 32
In another, more recent case,133 a woman who had been
receiving an allowance under the Family Benefits Act as a sole support
parent with two dependent children (aged two years and eight months)
appealed against a determination by the Director of Income
129 C.B. v. The Director, Income Maintenance Branch, North East Local Office (20 February
1989), Appeal No. G-06-15-05 (S.A.R.B.). This decision was affirmed by a different panel that
heard C.B.'s appeal: (27 November 1989), Appeal No. G-06-15-05R (SAR.B.).
13 0 Ibid at 3.
131 bid
132 Ibid. at 5.
133 XX v. The Director, Income Maintenance Branch (29 November 1990), Appeal No. J-06-
06-03 (S.A.A.B.).
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Maintenance that she had received an overpayment during a period in
which the father of her two children had moved back into her home.
After the separation, and while she was receiving family benefits, he had
moved back in an attempt to reconcile. Her evidence before SARB was
that she had been near exhaustion and "at that point reconciliation
sounded good if only that it might allow her to get a little extra sleep."134
Within a few weeks, she realized that the reconciliation was not going to
work, and she spent the next several months trying to remove him from
her home. The relationship during this period was marked by his
violence toward her. Approximately two months after her husband,
K.S., had moved back in to the house, she called the police but she
claimed that they declined to assist. In fact, she said that they told her
they could do nothing if his belongings were in the house. Expressing
the conflict and contradictions that many women in violent relationships
experience, she did not call the police again because, as she explained,
his family, "particularly his mother had provided her with a lot of
support" and "he was the father of her children," which made it difficult
for her to do so.13S While K.S. was back in the house, he had his own
room, paid a modest amount in room and board, and insisted that she
pay him five dollars each time she used his car. During the entire period
(unlike C.B.'s case), he had continued to pay $500 per month in child
support, which had been assigned by the recipient to the Provincial
Treasurer. The Board, not surprisingly, found this odd; the recipient
responded that if "Mr. K.S. had really been living with her, she would
have changed the arrangements so they would have had the money."136
The Director declared an overpayment for the ten-month period during
which KS. had resisted her efforts to remove him from her home.
The issue before sARB was whether she was a sole support parent
with dependent children, and hence eligible for an allowance under the
Family Benefits Act, or whether she had been living with her spouse and
was, therefore, ineligible? As with C.B., the Board found that K.S. fell
squarely within the definition of spouse in Regulation l(1)(d)(iii).3 7 Its
application seems to be a common sense interpretation of the phrase
"living together," and the Board found that during the ten months, they
had been living together to satisfy the letter of the Act and regulations.
13 4 IbM. at 4.
135 Ibid. at 6.
13 6 Ibid. at 5.
13 7 Supra note 121.
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Both women found themselves caught, not only by the definition
of spouse within the regulations and held to be living with him, but also
by the fact that the Board was inhibited by section 1(1)(a) from
considering the non-existent sexual relationship and by section 1(1)(b)
from considering the dearth of economic, social or familial aspects.138
As father of her children with an obligation to support them, he was her
spouse; as a result of their poverty, they lived in the same building. As a
result, each woman was ineligible to receive family benefits as a single
parent mother with dependent children as she was not living separately
and apart from her spouse.
For the women without men in their immediate vicinity (in and
around the house), the problems attendant with section 8 of the
regulations under the Family Benefits Act139 loom as large. This
regulation authorizes the director to reduce a monthly allowance if he or
she is not satisfied that an applicant or recipient is making a reasonable
effort to obtain support. A recipient or applicant who is a sponsored
dependant within the meaning of the Immigration Act' 40 is also included
within this category.
Recently, the Ontario Divisional Court considered the appeal of
a single mother who had been subjected to a Regulation 8 reduction of
forty dollars per month because she had refused to make an application
for child support.141 Her position was that she neither knew nor wanted
to know the whereabouts of the father of her little boy as she said he had
an alcohol and drug habit, was in and out of jail, and was just generally
13 8 R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 336.
139 R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 366, s. 8 [hereinafter Regulation 8]. The section in its entirety
provides:
Where the Director is not satisfied that an applicant or recipient is making reasonable
efforts to obtain compensation or realize any financial resource that the applicant,
recipient, or a beneficiary included or to be included in the recipients allowance, may be
entitled to or eligible for including, where the applicant, recipient or beneficiary is a
sponsored dependent or nominated relative within the meaning of the regulations under
the Immigration Act (Canada), any compensation or contribution to the support and
maintenance of the applicant, recipient or beneficiary that may result from any
undertaking or engagement made on his behalf under the said regulations between the
Government of Canada and the nominator or sponsor, the Director may determine that
the applicant, recipient or beneficiary is not eligible for a benefit or he may reduce the
amount of an allowance granted by the amount of the compensation, contribution or
financial resource, as the case may be, that in the Director's opinion is available to the
applicant, recipient or beneficiary.
140 R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-2. See Immigration Regulations, C.R.C., c. 940, s. 41.
141 Campbell v. Ontario (Director, Income Maintenance Branch, Ministy of Community and
Social Services) (1990), 71 D.L.R. (4th) 765.
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"messed up." Finally, she added that she did not want to "bring him to
court because she didn't want him to have any rights to Joey."1 42
O'Driscoll J., writing for the Court, agreed with the Director's view. The
appellant's view that an application for support would be both fruitless
and potentially problematic for her did not absolve her of the obligation
to make a reasonable effort to obtain compensation from the father.
However, the Court found that there had been no evidence that would
justify a conclusion that, even had she undertaken the application, she
would have received forty dollars per month in support. Thus, she lost a
little and won a little; the matter was sent back to SARB on that point
only.143
In a recently published study of the operation of Regulation 8,
former family benefits caseworker Kathleen Lawrence has alleged that a
disproportionately high number of racial minority family benefits
recipients have "Regulation 8 charges" deducted from their
allowance. 44 She suggests that racial minority recipients are six times
more likely than white recipients to experience these charges, which
prompted her to file a complaint with the Ontario Human Rights
Commission in 1990.145
142 Ibid. at 767.
143 Ibid.; I understand from Ian Morrison, Director of the Clinic Resource Office, that the
appeal on the principal issue was later withdrawn.
144 K. Lawrence, "Systemic Discrimination: Regulation 8-Family Benefits Act: Policy of
Reasonable Efforts to Obtain Financial Resources" (1990) 6 J. L. & Soc. Pol'y 57. Lawrence's
study involved two caseload reviews conducted in 1988 in one family benefits office, but covering
two different geographical areas in Metropolitan Toronto. The first review involved a caseload of
365, of which 311 cases were mothers with dependent children. The remaining fifty-four cases
involved the category of single father, dependent father, foster parent, permanently unemployable,
and so on. None of the latter group had received Regulation 8 charges. Of the 311 mothers, 210
were identified as "white" and 101 were identified as "racial minority," which included "Black, East
Indian, Oriental, and Native women." Tb4 at 61. Seventeen of the 311 mothers had Regulation 8
charges against their family benefits allowances: five white mothers and twelve racial minority
mothers. Lawrence concluded, ibid. at 62, that "[w]hile racial minority recipients comprise only 1/3
of this caseload, they comprise over 2/3 (70.6%) of the recipients who have Regulation 8 charges
brought against them." She also found, at 63, that "both in absolute and relative terms, racial
minorities had higher amounts deducted from their basic grant." The second caseload review,
involving 400 recipients, was not broken down by classification; however, the racial identity of the
twenty-one recipients who had received Regulation 8 reductions was noted, and again Lawrence, at
63 and at 66, found that racial minority recipients "were also disproportionately represented": eight,
or 38 per cent, white recipients and thirteen, or 62 per cent, racial minority recipients.
1451bid. at 62 and at 75-76; see also G. Allen, "Welfare system discriminates on basis of race,
study says" The [Toronto] Globe & Mail (20 June 1989) A17. The Minister of Community and
Social Services rejected the charges of discrimination.
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As preliminary as Lawrence's study may be, it again illustrates
that feminists committed to understanding the operation and conditions
of women's subordination must be attentive to not only gender, race,
class, and heterosexism, but to the manner, sites, and sources of their
inter-connectedness. The inter-relationships of gender, class, and race
have to be understood, not only for poor women of colour who are single
parents in need of social assistance, but for all of us. There are no
discrete variables or crucibles, only complex social relations in which the
"family," with all of its ideological baggage, is most clearly expressed.
VI. CONCLUSION
Where is the paradise lost? What paradox is revisited? In this
paper I have revisited socialist feminist work on the family. I have
attempted to illustrate that the analytical and political challenge posed
by diverse experiences of family life strengthens, rather than
undermines, the critique of "the family." I have also suggested that the
struggles of lesbians and gay men for social equality and the elimination
of heterosexist experiences cannot be found in the very bosom of their
provenance. There is of course no clear or obvious way forward.
It seems to me that the conditions of life and, I suppose, law, in
the last several years have given rise to what I regard as the paradox:
progressive movements, disheartened by the cumulative experience of
Reagan, Thatcher, Mulroney, and Bush administrations, devastated by
the immensity of the AIDS crisis, and overwhelmed by the apparent
impossibility of "real" social change, have returned to the "here and
now." The availability and seeming inevitability of legality constrains
our imagination 146 and frames our exchanges. We no longer attempt to
envision different forms of relationships, the transcendence of the
current ideal.
In the current global economic crisis, it surely seems mean-
spirited to deny access to whatever modicum of economic or family-
based benefits available, particularly as the Canadian welfare state
shrinks, relegating ever more responsibility for the social well-being and
welfare of its citizens to the private familial sphere. Nonetheless, I have
attempted here to illustrate the difficulties with a strategy that appears
to offer a self-evident short-term solution. Those of us with our doubts
may encounter the suggestion that we want others to wait for "the
146 Thanks once again, Judy Fudge.
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revolution." 147 Do we? It depends. A fundamental transformation of
the social order seems as impossible as the rebuilding of the Berlin Wall.
And yet, the women's movement and the trade union movement have
sparked important "de-familializing" campaigns, particularly the struggle
for universal child care, for women's access to safe birth control and
legal abortion free from spousal hindrance, for equal pay and
employment equity, and against family violence. Beyond these have
been the campaigns for full participation of the disabled in work and
culture, and for the protection and extension of universal health care.
None of these struggles has yet been won, 148 but in pressing each and
every demand we implicitly chip away at the ideological assumptions
regarding the family. Women have a right to good jobs. Children
flourish in excellent child care centres. People with disabilities should
neither be under defacto house arrest nor consigned to their families for
care. Publicly funded, universal health care, not privatized and privately
funded home care, is a fundamental, if perilously fragile, social right.
In my opinion, one's access or entitlement to social benefits, to
health care, dental care, long-term disability benefits, and bereavement
leave is, in sum, one's dignity and personal and economic security. It
should not, and need not, depend upon being situated in or relegated to
a familial relationship. And when this seems impossible, we might
remember Antonio Gramsci: while we have "pessimism of the
intelligence," we must have "optimism of the will."149 Paradise can be
imagined.
1 47 As Didi Herman intimates, supra note 52 at 802.
148 See, for example Luxton & Maroney, supra note 7 at 17, who argue that with
establishment of daycare facilities in urban centres in Canada in the 1970s, socialist feminists seized
the opportunity to create democratically run centres where children could be cared for "collectively
in non-sexist, mixed class and race environments which were sex-positive and encouraged child
autonomy" [references omitted]. Virtually simultaneously, they experienced the contradictions of
state funding and state regulation, which tended to undermine the more visionary intentions.
149 Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, ed. by and trans. Q. Hoare &
G.N. Smith (New York International Publishers, 1971) at 175.
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